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Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; 
as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly 
stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is 
reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so 
considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any 
benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to 
the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the 
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with 
others. . . .  
—Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. XIII 
I. INTRODUCTION: TRAGEDY AND ITS RESPONSE 
Ever since the murderous attacks on the World Trade Towers, the 
Pentagon, and U.S. Airlines flight 93, scholars have wrestled with their 
legal ramifications.1 Although much of the early writing on the subject 
was largely reactive in nature, it is now appropriate to pause and consider 
the broader implications of the September 11th attacks for international 
law and international relations in general. In this regard, it has become 
apparent that not only were the attacks devastating in terms of loss of 
human life and their impact on the United States, but that they, and the 
 
 
 * Professor of Law and Israel Treiman Faculty Fellow, Washington University in St. Louis and 
Commissioner, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. This essay was 
adapted from a speech given at the Sutton Colloquium on International Law at the University of 
Denver College of Law on March 23, 2002. It reflects only the personal views of the author. Thanks to 
Fr. Robert Araujo, Kelly Dawn Askin, Allison Danner, Mark Drumbl, Malvina Halberstam, Elaine 
Harvey, Larry May, Sean Murphy, James Nafziger, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jordan J. Paust, and 
Ambassador Sylvester Rowe for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work. 
 1. Daryl A. Mundis, Agara: Military Commissions, The Use of Military Commissions to 
Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 320-58 (2002); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Focus September 11, 2001—Legal Responses to Terror, Legal Control of International 
Terrorism: A Policy Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 83, 83-103 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, 
Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2001).
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U.S. response they have evoked, have the potential to irreparably damage 
international law and international institutions, with deeply troubling and 
even dire consequences for world peace, stability, and the international 
rule of law.  
It is the premise of this Essay that by characterizing the September 11th 
attacks as acts of war rather than as terrorism or crimes against humanity, 
the United States has lost what could have been an extraordinary 
opportunity to strengthen international legal norms and combat 
international terrorism. Instead, the U.S. government has relied upon these 
terrorist acts to justify the pursuit of a unilateralist agenda that, contrary to 
the language and the spirit of the United Nations Charter, appears to reject 
any legal constraints on the use of American power abroad. It is worth 
considering, as an aside, that this departure from the Charter framework, 
without anything to substitute in its place, may lead to increasing and even 
catastrophic violence on a global scale.2 A full discussion of the 
potentially dismal future that could result is beyond the scope of this 
Essay, which confines itself to suggesting that rather than viewing the 
attacks of September 11th as acts of war, they should have been treated as 
international crimes for which the perpetrators should be apprehended, 
tried and, if convicted, punished. Moreover, it suggests that only by 
increasing its efforts to strengthen international norms and institutions will 
the United States ultimately achieve its goal of successfully combating 
international terrorism.  
II. TERRORISM AND THE RHETORIC OF WAR 
Shortly following the horrific attacks on the twin towers, the Pentagon, 
and U.S. Airlines flight 93, President Bush, addressing a Joint Session of 
Congress, outlined the policy of the government to conduct a “war on 
terror” that will “begin[] with al-Qaeda, but . . . does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped 
and defeated.”3 With regard to the Taliban specifically, the President 
spelled out several ultimatums, none of which were “open to negotiation 
or discussion.”4 In particular, the Taliban regime was to “hand over the 
 
 
 2. See Tom J. Farer, Beyond the Charter Front: Unilateralism or Condominium, Editorial 
Comment, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 364 (2002). 
 3. George W. Bush, Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-010920-usia01.htm (last visited Sept. 
8, 2003) [hereinafter September 20th Presidential address]. 
 4. Id. 
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terrorists, or . . . share in their fate.”5  
As a matter of international law, the government’s position with regard 
to the terrorist attacks was less clear, but appeared to be essentially as 
follows. First, the attacks amounted to an “armed attack” against the 
United States of America, which entitled the United States to invoke 
article 51 of the U.N. Charter in self-defense and take military action 
against those who had committed the attacks, any regime that harbored 
them, or other terrorists that have in the past or could in the future attack 
the United States.6 Additionally, the attack created a state of “war” 
between the United States and some other entities, although it is not 
entirely clear whether the war was with the al Qaeda terrorist network, the 
Taliban regime, the State of Afghanistan, or some combination thereof.7
This was the rationale invoked in support of the military operation 
(“Operation Enduring Freedom”) in Afghanistan which began on October 
7, 2001,8 and presumably was also the basis upon which the administration 
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. There appears to have been a general consensus on September 11th and immediately after 
that the acts of September 11th amounted to an “armed attack” against the United States, within the 
meaning of article 51 of the United Nations Charter due to their scale and effect, although the 
implications of that finding are unclear given that they were carried out by non-state actors. 
Confirming a speech given the day after the attack, Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, stated 
that  
it has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed 
from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all. 
Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement at NATO Headquarters, (Oct. 2, 2001), at 
http://www.nato.int/docu1speech/2001/s011002a.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003); NATO Press Release 
No. 124, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, (Sept. 12, 2001), at http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
pr/2001/po1-124e.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003). 
 7. For example, Section 1(A) of the President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 
provides: “International terrorists. . . have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military 
personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale that has 
created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces.” Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 
(Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter “Military Order”]. Subsequently, the administration suggested that the 
state of armed conflict may have commenced a decade ago, and reiterated its position that an “armed 
conflict” existed between the U.S. government and the al Qaeda organization. Pierre-Richard Prosper 
& Michael A. Newton, The Bush Administration View of International Accountability, 36 NEW 
ENGLAND L. REV. 891, 898-99 (2002). 
 8. The operation was initially code-named “Infinite Justice,” but was changed to Operation 
“Enduring Freedom” on September 25, 2001 after Muslim clerics objected that only Allah could mete 
out infinite justice. Operation Infinite Justice, at http://globalsecurity.org/military/ops/infinite-
justice.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003). The terminology used by the administration to describe the war 
has often had religious overtones and some have suggested that the code name “Infinite Justice” was 
deliberately chosen as a reference to the “fundamentalist Christian doctrine of retribution.” Notes from 
the Editors, MONTHLY REVIEW Nov. 2001, http://www.monthlyreview.org/nfte1101.htm (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2003). But see Operation Infinite Justice, supra http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ 
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asserted the right to pursue military operations in the Philippines, and 
subsequently against the three so-called “axis of evil” countries:9 Iran,10 
Iraq11 and North Korea.12 The U.S. position was formally communicated 
to the United Nations in a letter dated October 7, 2001: 
 
 
ops.infinite-justice.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003) (stating that “the name [Infinite Justice] can be 
traced back to the 1998 Operation Infinite Reach air strikes against Osama bin Laden’s facilities in 
Afghanistan and Sudan”). 
 9. These three countries were named in the State of the Union Address of President George W. 
Bush on January 29, 2002. In the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published 
by the White House in September 2002, the ”Bush Doctrine” was expanded to include not only 
responses to terrorism after the fact as a matter of self-defense, but cases of preemptive self-defense to 
prevent terrorists from “doing harm against our people and our country.” The White House, The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 15, 2002), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsall.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2003). 
 10. In March 2003, the Bush Administration expressed its “deep concern” that Iran’s nuclear 
program was for the purpose of developing atomic weapons, and not for peaceful purposes. White 
House Distrusts Iran on Nuclear Power, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 2003, at A7. More 
recently, the Bush Administration has encouraged internal dissent within Iran, hoping that protests will 
lead to a change of government and ultimately to abandonment of Iran’s potential nuclear program. 
Jonathon Wright, Bush Takes Risks in Iran Policy, Analysts Say, REUTERS NEWS, June 20, 2003. 
 11. Following the refusal of the United Nations to approve action against Iraq, on March 18, 
2003 President Bush declared that among other things, Iraq has “a deep hatred of America . . . [a]nd 
has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda,” “Saddam Hussein and his 
sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours,” or war, led by the United States, will result. Subsequently, in a 
letter to the Security Council, John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations announced 
that, “[C]oalition forces have commenced military operations in Iraq.” Letter from the Permanent 
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, Mar. 20, 2003, at http://www.un.int/usa/s2003_351.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2003). 
The U.S. relied on Iraq’s breaches of Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, 1411. Id. Negroponte 
states that the “actions . . . are necessary steps to defend the United States and the international 
community from the threat posed by Iraq and to restore international peace and security in the area.” 
Id.  
 12. Relations between the United States and North Korea have become particularly tense over 
the last year, since North Korea admitted in October 2002 that it had an illicit uranium enrichment 
program, shortly thereafter repudiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, fired two test missiles 
into the Sea of Japan, and demanded a non-aggression pact from the United States. North Korea: 
Expecting Trouble?, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2003, at 37. In response to North Korea’s repudiation of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bush Administration has been divided on how to proceed in 
its negotiations with North Korea. U.S. intelligence believes that North Korea is developing 
technology for nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop the country’s growing arsenal of missiles. 
The U.S. has pressed the U.N. Security Council to approve a statement condemning North Korea for 
reviving its nuclear weapons program, but China and Russia have blocked the action. The North 
Korean government continues to insist instead on bilateral talks with the United States Irwin Arieff, 
North Korea complains to U.N. about U.S. “hostile acts,” REUTERS NEWS, July 14, 2003. See also 
Glenn Kessler, North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions are Urgent Issue, Powell Says, WASH. POST, June 
19, 2003. Although President Bush has said he wants a “diplomatic solution to the problem,” he has 
also stated that he “would not foreclose any option, including military ones” President Roh has stated 
that ”any preemptive strike against the North’s nuclear facilities could prove disastrous.” David E. 
Sanger, U.S. Fears Warhead Gains by Pyongyang Unit Miniaturization Would Allow Missiles to Strike 
Wider Areas, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 2, 2003, 2003 WL 56179302. 
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The attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ongoing threat to the 
United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization 
have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to 
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this 
organization as a base of operation.  
 Despite every effort by the United States and the international 
community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. 
From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization 
continues to train and support agents of terror who attack innocent 
people throughout the world and target United States nationals and 
interests in the United States and abroad.  
 In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defence, United States armed 
forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further 
attacks on the United States. These actions include measures against 
Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.13
There have been suggestions for some time by senior officials of the 
United States government that the rubric of war should apply to acts of 
international terrorism, although the current administration has capitalized 
on this war rhetoric to a greater degree than previous governments. 
Foreshadowing President Bush’s response to the acts of September 11th, 
after the attacks on the two U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, then 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright suggested that international terrorism 
would be the “war of the future.”14 Ten years earlier, Abraham Sofaer, 
then legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State, argued that the legal 
rules surrounding the use of force, the concept of armed attack, and respect 
for territorial integrity impose “serious limits on strategic flexibility,” and 
could not be permitted to “interfere with legitimate national security 
measures.”15
 
 
 13. Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/946, (2002) [hereinafter Letter of October 7, 2001]. 
 14. Tyler Raimo, Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of Expanding Counter-
Terrorism Law Enforcement Jurisdiction Overseas, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1473, 1484 n.57 (1999) 
(quoting Tim Butcher & Hugh Davies, U.S. Strike Was “First Blow in the War of The Future”: 
Washington Seeks Support for Long Campaign Against Global Terrorism, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 
1998, at A1). 
 15. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law and National Defense 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 90-122 
(1989). 
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Although using the language of war and describing the September 11th 
attacks as war crimes may be a convenient rhetorical device to describe the 
struggle to cripple international terrorist organizations, it is not consonant 
with existing and well-established principles of international law.16 As I 
have noted in earlier writings, under the international law instruments 
criminalizing violations of the laws and customs of war, including the 
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, an individual cannot 
legally commit a “war crime” unless a state of “armed conflict” exists.17 
As the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found in the Tadić case, “an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”18 It is 
apparent from this definition that a transnational group of terrorists is not 
engaged in “armed conflict,” in the legal sense of the word, but is 
engaging in organized crime.  
Requiring the existence of an armed conflict for the application of the 
laws and customs of war is not simply a legal technicality that may be 
casually brushed aside. Prior to reaching that threshold, internal or even 
cross border disturbances do not become the province of international 
humanitarian law, but must be resolved internally if they occur within a 
state,19 or by diplomacy or other means if they occur transnationally.20 The 
 
 
 16. The U.S. position also permitted the President to argue that any foreigners captured as a 
result of the military operations could be tried as war criminals in military tribunals established for that 
purpose, which would have been impossible had they been charged with violations of “ordinary” 
criminal laws against terrorism and mass murder. Somewhat inconsistently, the Bush administration, 
having established military jurisdiction by declaring the terrorist attacks to be constitutive of a state of 
armed conflict, subsequently sought to deprive any individuals captured as a result of Operation 
Enduring Freedom of the protection of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War by arguing that they were “unlawful combatants.” This Essay will not address this particular 
ramification of the treatment of the September 11th attacks as acts of war. 
 17. Leila Nadya Sadat & Richard S. Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 434 (2000). 
 18. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct.2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić]. 
 19. In fact, during the Rome Diplomatic Conference, states were adamant in insisting that 
sporadic acts of violence or rebellion would not trigger the application of international humanitarian 
law, and article 8(d) reinforces that view. It provides that the provisions of the Statute on non-
international armed conflict falling within common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions would 
not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence or other acts of a similar nature.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 8(d), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also 
id. art. 8(f) (providing that for other violations of the laws and customs applicable in “armed conflicts 
not of an international character,” the Statute only applies “when there is protracted armed conflict 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss1/5
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laws of war do not apply to such disorders, nor are individuals potentially 
criminally liable under the laws of war for crimes they may commit during 
them. Although individuals could be answerable for crimes against 
humanity, provided that the elements of the crime are present, because it is 
an offense not predicated on the existence of an armed conflict for its 
application. Ironically, the administration’s suggestion that the members 
of al Qaeda are engaged in “armed conflict”21 could be interpreted to 
imply that the “conflict” waged by al Qaeda is not itself illegal in nature, 
but that it is the means used which are problematic, a thesis with which 
most observers would disagree.22 Moreover, reducing or eliminating the 
“armed conflict” threshold for the application of the laws of war would not 
appear to be in the best interests of the United States. For example, the 
United States often conducts military actions, such as the 1998 bombing 
raids in the Sudan and Afghanistan, without real concern as to allegations 
that they constitute war crimes, because those uses of force, which are 
both short in duration and limited in scope, do not rise to the level of an 
armed conflict.23 Eliminating the “armed conflict” threshold for the 
application of the laws of war could also suggest that covert operations, if 
discovered, could either initiate a state of armed conflict within the target 
country, or, at the very least, be subject to the laws of war. 
Setting aside the question whether the use of force by the United States 
in Afghanistan was a lawful measure of self-defense under the U.N. 
Charter, the question remains whether the Bush Doctrine is supported by 
 
 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”). 
 20. The Geneva Conventions refer, in common article 2, to their application “to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties.” See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Hague Convention (No. IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Annex, provides that “the provisions 
contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply 
except between Contracting Powers . . . .” Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, and Annex, Oct. 16, 1907, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. 
 21. See supra note 7. 
 22. When the United States military invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2002, a state of armed 
conflict was clearly invoked, and international humanitarian law applied, and would, under the 
definition set out in the Tadić opinion, exist “from the initiation of such armed conflict[] . . . . until a 
general conclusion of peace is reached.” Tadić, supra note 18, at ¶ 70. 
 23. For this reason, the 1998 bombing raids on the Sudan and Afghanistan would not fall within 
the prohibitions of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, even though some might 
characterize them as illegal uses of force under article 2(4) of the Charter. Sadat & Carden, Uneasy 
Revolution, supra note 17, at 429 n.294, 434-36. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, International Legal 
Response to Terrorism, 22 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 3, 8 (1999). Those supporting the use of force argue 
that the criminal enforcement model is part of the problem, not the solution. Abraham D. Sofaer, 
Playing Games with Terrorists, 36 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 903, 904 (2002). 
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international law.24 The obvious difficulty of this doctrine is that it posits 
the use of armed force in self-defense, without the constraints of Security 
Council authorization, against criminal organizations operating in the 
territory of a sovereign state when that state has not, as a matter of law, 
perpetrated an armed attack  against the United States. Even if the attacks 
of September 11th are considered armed attacks by a state for purposes of 
the U.N. Charter to justify the U.S. military response against Afghanistan, 
this fact alone would not support attacks against other states as preventive 
measures. Indeed, the pre-emption doctrine now advocated by the Bush 
administration is clearly in direct contravention of article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter, and undermines the most fundamental principles of the 
international legal order—the prohibition on the use of force and the 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states.  
In addition, it is not difficult to imagine the corrosive effect that 
adopting the U.S. view as a matter of international law would have on 
international peace and security. Under the Bush doctrine, if the 
government decided to prosecute the “war” against al Qaeda operatives 
worldwide, it could potentially result in military incursions in any of the 
sixty countries in which al Qaeda members are reportedly found.25 It 
cannot seriously be argued that the U.N. Charter envisaged that a country 
would be able to use force on such a basis against nearly one-third of the 
United Nations’ member states without prior Security Council 
authorization.26 In addition, international law is largely a product of state 
practice and reciprocity. To put it neatly, should the U.S. view prevail, the 
doctrine of unilateral self-defense against terrorist attacks could 
presumably be applied by any country, including, for example, Indonesia, 
India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and China, which have each recently 
suffered terrorist attacks. The potentially destabilizing effect of the Bush 
doctrine, if taken to its logical extension, is therefore quite substantial. As 
Professor Schachter wrote some years ago:  
The right of self-defense, “inherent” though it may be, cannot be 
autonomous. To consider it as above or outside the law renders it 
 
 
 24. The letter to the United Nations refers to any terrorist organization “of global reach.” Letter 
of October 7, 2001, supra note 13. 
 25. James Dao, A Nation Challenged: The Threats; Defense Secretary Warns of Unconventional 
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001 (late ed.), at B5; Robert D. McFadden, A Nation Challenged: An 
Overview: Nov. 18, 2001; Seeking a Kabul Coalition, Killings in Kunduz and Bodies in the Rubble, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001 (late ed.), at B1. 
 26. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 273 
(1989). 
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more probable that force will be used unilaterally and abusively. No 
state or people can face that prospect with equanimity in the present 
world . . . . [S]elf-defense must be regarded as limited and not only 
legitimated by law . . . . The political will that is necessary depends 
on understanding both the danger of unbridled force and the 
necessity of legal and institutional control . . . . It is through such 
concrete measures that international law may in time strengthen the 
national security of all states.27
It is true that the lack of any real objection to the military campaign 
initiated on October 7, 2001 suggests that the world community viewed 
the United States’ actions in Afghanistan as legitimate acts of self-defense 
for which no Security Council authorization was required and, therefore, 
as implicit support for the Bush Doctrine, writ large. However, the 
vociferous objection of most of the United Nations’ membership to 
subsequent U.S. proposals to effectuate “regime change” in Iraq,28 an 
action justified at least in part as a question of “self-defense,” suggests that 
no such new understanding was established either by the attacks of 
September 11th or “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Moreover, although 
the rhetoric of a legal “war against terrorism” was well-accepted by many 
leading academics and policy makers in the United States (particularly 
right after September 11), foreign commentators, particularly in Europe 
and the Middle East, have been much more skeptical of this claim. Indeed, 
many Europeans find the American use of the term unsupported by law 
and have expressed alarm at the implications of a “global war” against 
terrorism, even if they have supported the military response against the 
Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.29 Finally, even if one can stretch the 
 
 
 27. Id. at 277. 
 28. The Turkish Parliament rejected the U.S. request to stage troops on the Iraqi border; the Arab 
League agreed on a final statement rejecting any war against Iraq; while France and Russia indicated 
their intent to veto a Resolution calling for the use of force against Iraq, and the U.S. therefore decided 
to proceed to war without a Resolution from the Security Council. Joel Brinkley, Turkey’s ‘No’ 
Frustrates War Plans: Arab Leaders Add to Setbacks for U.S. Policy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 3, 
2003, at 1; Jon Sawyer, Bush: Exile or War; President Gives Saddam Hussein 48 Hours to Leave Iraq, 
or else U.S. Will Invade, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 2003, at A1. According to press reports, 
the countries appearing to back the use of force were Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Geoffrey Kemp, Colin Powell and the Gangs of 
Europe, IN THE NAT’L INTEREST, Feb. 12, 2003, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/articles/ 
vol2issue6/vol2issue6kempppfv.html (last visited, Sept. 17, 2003). 
 29. See generally Georges Abi-Saab, There is no Need to Reinvent the Law, in A Defining 
Moment & International Law since September 11, Crimes of War Project, at 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/sept-abi.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003); Antonio Cassese, 
Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
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meaning of article 51 to encompass armed attacks by non-state actors, a 
proposition that is neither self-evident nor without controversy,30 there is 
no evidence, other than assertions by a limited number of countries, 
including the United States, that this principle permits a country to wage 
war against states in which terrorists are located on the grounds that the 
terrorists have created an armed conflict to which the U.S. is responding.  
To the extent the international community supported the U.S. military 
response to the September 11th attacks, I believe it did so on the 
understanding that a fairly classical interpretation of the doctrine of self-
defense applied because the Taliban could be considered legally 
responsible for al Qaeda’s crimes.31 Alternatively, it could take comfort in 
 
 
993 (2001); Luigi Condorelli, Les Attentats du 11 Septembre et leurs suites: où va le droit 
international?, 105 REVUE GÉNÉRAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 829 (2001); Frédéric Mégret, 
‘War’? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 361 (2002). 
 30. The argument for suggesting that article 51 supports military attacks against non-state actors 
rests upon the differences in wording of article 51 and article 2(4). Because article 51 does not include 
the words “Member State,” whereas article 2(4) does, they are asymmetric. This asymmentry has led 
some writers to conclude that this difference implies that although article 2(4) only forbids attacks 
against Member States, article 51 permits military responses in self-defense even against non-state 
actors. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the 
U.N Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 41, 50 (2002). However, although articles 2(4) and 51 are indeed 
asymmetric, there appears to be no textual support in the Charter or its travaux préparatoires for the 
proposition that criminal actions committed by non-state actors fall within article 51 of the Charter. 
None of the major commentaries on the U.N. Charter appear to support this reading of articles 2(4) and 
51. See, e.g., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 106-28, 661-78 (Bruno 
Simma ed., 1994); CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 43-55, 342-53 (Leland M. Goodrich et al. eds., 
1969); LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNICS 115-28, 771-95 (Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet eds. 2d ed., 
1991) [hereinafter PELLET COMMENTARY]. Indeed, Casesse’s commentary on article 51 in the PELLET 
COMMENTARY suggests precisely the opposite. PELLET COMMENTARY, at 772. This is perhaps because 
such an interpretation would, in most circumstances, violate the Charter and its purposes. Any 
sustained military action by a state in response to a terrorist attack against a non-state actor, will 
violate the prohibition of article 2(4) because the territory attacked will almost always be that of a 
Member State. Unless the state upon whose territory the terrorist group appears to be headquartered is 
itself responsible for the attack, to use force against that state in response to a terrorist attack that 
appears to emanate from a group found in that state can be likened to the collective punishment of the 
citizenry of the state in question. For the view that non-state actors may commit armed attacks that 
trigger the application of article 51, see generally Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against 
Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 533 (2003). 
 31. The United Kingdom published a paper on October 4, 2001, detailing the links between al 
Qaeda and the Taliban. British Release Evidence Against bin Laden http://www.salon.com/news. . ./ 
2001/10/04/british_evidence/print.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001). Of course, under the current law of 
State Responsibility, establishing Afghan liability for actions of al Qaeda, may be difficult. Although 
articles 4 to 11 (attribution of conduct to a state) and the holding of the International Court of Justice in 
the Nicaragua case do not appear to suggest an immediate theory of responsibility given that the 
Taliban did not appear to direct, control or acknowledge or adopt the actions of al Qaeda, if it can 
nevertheless be said that the Taliban permitted al Qaeda to engage in acts of international terrorism 
and that it breached its obligation to prevent al Qaeda’s actions in a “gross and systematic” fashion, it 
could perhaps be argued that the Taliban was responsible for al Qaeda’s activities. A full discussion of 
this problem is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
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the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 which, 
although notably silent on the use of force, recognize “the inherent right of 
self defense.”32 Support, either tacit or explicit, for the Afghanistan 
campaign seems to be limited to the particular facts of that case. Such 
support included two Security Council resolutions expressing support for 
the principle of self-defense; persistent calls to the Taliban, the de facto 
government of the country to “hand over” the suspected terrorists; a 
convincing public, prima facie case against the suspected terrorist 
organization; a government that was unrecognized by the United Nations 
and nearly every other country in the world;33 and prior demands to that 
government from the Security Council demanding bin Laden’s surrender 
for other crimes.34
III. TERRORISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
We have seen that although an argument can be made that the acts of 
September 11th may be characterized as acts of war to which states may 
respond in self-defense, unless very narrowly framed, that theory fits 
uneasily within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, 
particularly if it is extended beyond the facts of the particular case, it has 
some very negative implications for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Although not the principle focus of this Essay, it is 
worth noting that this argument may also give rise to several additional 
legal consequences.35  
 
 
 32. The meaning of the Resolution is extraordinarily ambiguous, although at least some 
governments have indicated that it has provided legitimacy to the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan. 
See Bush Vows to Keep Pressure on bin Laden, Nov. 6: Briefing with French President Chirac at 
White House, at http://www.uninfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01110619.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 
2003) (statement of French President Jacques Chirac). 
 33. Indeed, some have argued that the U.S. did not invade Afghanistan at all, but simply 
responded to an invitation from the recognized government to remove the Taliban from power. See 
Judy Aita, Islamic State of Afghanistan Willing to Hunt Bin Laden, U.N. Ambassador says Afghans 
Tired of Taliban, Usama bin Laden, U.S. Department of State International Information Programs 
(Sept. 18, 2001), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01091804.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2003). 
 34. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 (1999); S.C. 
Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1333 (2000). 
 35. U.S. Asks Agency To Dismiss Complaint About Cuba Prisoners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2002. 
“President George W. Bush has designated six captives suspected of involvement in terrorism as 
eligible to be tried before military tribunals, setting in motion the process that officials say will soon 
lead to the use of the first such tribunals by the United States in more than 50 years.” Neil A. Lewis, 
Bush Moves to Begin Military Trials of Terror Suspects, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 5, 2003. 
However, the response from overseas has created further speculation as to the Bush Administration’s 
approach to the issue. Just Don’t Kill Them: American Military Justice, Seen From Overseas, THE 
ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 28. See also Unjust, Unwise, UnAmerican—Why America’s Military 
Tribunals are Wrong, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 9. 
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First, to the extent that al Qaeda is treated as an enemy state that is “at 
war” with the United States, it would follow that its attacks on military 
targets, such as the U.S.S. Cole and even the Pentagon, were arguably 
lawful, which they clearly would not be if they were simply characterized 
as the acts of organized international criminals. Of course, treating these 
acts as war crimes rather than crimes of international terrorism has certain 
domestic consequences that the government may see as desirable, such as 
the opportunity to subject the accused to military, rather than civilian 
courts; the general enlargement of the President’s power over the 
investigation and prosecution of the accused, including detention abroad, 
rather than in U.S. jails; the avoidance of the Posse Comitatus act36; and 
the continued ability to use military force to attempt to apprehend the 
terrorists and attack the terrorist networks. The question that remains, 
however, is whether it is necessary or even desirable to bend the law in 
such a way both domestically and as a matter of international law for the 
United States to achieve its legitimate security goals.  
A decade or two ago, the answer to this question might have been less 
clear. Although the second half of the twentieth century witnessed 
tremendous growth in the normative content of international criminal law 
with the adoption of several important counter-terrorism treaties, including 
a series of treaties relating to air safety and airplane hijacking, maritime 
navigation, fixed platforms on the continental shelf, hostage taking, and 
the safety of internationally protected persons,37 the international 
 
 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2002). The Posse Comitatus Act provides that “[w]hoever, except in cases 
and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses 
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” Id.   
 The term, which literally means “power of the county,” refers to the common law right of the 
sheriff to commandeer the assistance of citizens in enforcing the law. U.S. troops were used to enforce 
domestic law up until the years of Reconstruction after the Civil War, when, as a result of the soldiers’ 
excesses, a successful movement was waged in Congress to eliminate the practice. The act was passed 
in its original form in 1878 and was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 15 (current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1385 
(2002)). Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse Comitatus Act (18 
U.S.C.A. § 1385), and Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting Use of United States Army and Air 
Force to Enforce Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 409 (2003). 
 37. See Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) 
opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (opened for signature Mar. 
10, 1988), 1678 U.N.T.S. 349; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 
201 (1988); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages opened for signature Dec. 17, 
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
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community was, nonetheless, not united in its condemnation of 
international terrorism. Persistent debates remained whether there was any 
uniform definition of the crime. In particular, members of the non-aligned 
group of countries argued for the exclusion of violent actions undertaken 
by groups fighting in the struggle of national liberation movements.  
Moreover, despite the significant progress made in criminalizing 
particular offenses through the adoption of international treaties, there is 
little doubt that enforcement of those treaties was problematic. Most anti-
terrorism conventions impose a form of “universal jurisdiction by 
treaty,”38 which grants any state to which the alleged terrorist travels 
jurisdiction to prosecute him or her. Additionally, these treaties generally 
impose upon states the duty to try or extradite international terrorists (aut 
dedere aut judicare), and in this manner create a net through which the 
terrorist has difficulty escaping. Yet these instruments notwithstanding, 
legal experts vigorously debated whether terrorism could generally be 
considered a universal jurisdiction crime, due, in part, to the difficulties 
concerning it’s definition, described above. Additionally, the crucial 
enforcement mechanism of the counter-terrorism treaties, aut dedere, aut 
judicare, was generally not believed to be a norm of customary 
international law, although certain prominent scholars argued to the 
contrary.39 Thus, to the extent a terrorist remained on the territory of a 
“friendly” or incompetent state, that is, a state which was either powerless 
or not inclined to investigate and punish the criminal in question, that 
terrorist could largely avoid the application of international law. 
Many of these difficulties have been ameliorated in recent times, due to 
the tremendous progress not only with regard to the enforcement of 
international norms condemning terrorism, but in parallel areas of 
international criminal law. To begin with, in 1993 and 1994 the Security 
Council took the unprecedented step of establishing the two ad hoc 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.40 Although there was 
 
 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents opened for signature 
Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. 
 38. JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 157 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
 39. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE, AUT JUDICARE: 
THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995). 
 40. The ICTY was Established by S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. 
Doc. S/Res/808 (1993). The Tribunal’s statute appears in an Annex to the Secretary-General’s report. 
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, S.C. 
Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add. 1 (1993). The Security Council adopted the 
Secretary-General’s draft of the statute without change in Resolution 827. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 
48th sess. 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993); The ICTR was Established by Security Council 
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initial scepticism as to whether those tribunals would be able to indict and 
apprehend those thought most culpable in the wars and atrocities 
committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, they have been effective 
and successful, even if not perfect, institutions. Building upon those 
precedents, the International Criminal Court Treaty was proposed, 
negotiated, and adopted and entered into force decades sooner than most 
would have thought possible.41 Those institutions’ jurisdiction does not 
encompass the crime of terrorism, except to the extent that acts of 
terrorism could be considered crimes against humanity. But the Lockerbie 
trial, which did address acts of terrorism, is an example of international 
enforcement that was successfully undertaken by the international 
community.  
The last decade also brought progress in achieving an international 
consensus on the per se illegality of widespread attacks on civilian 
populations. In 1994 the General Assembly took the position that 
“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable.”42 The Declaration also 
required states to “refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in terrorist acts in territories of other states, or from 
acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their territories directed 
towards the commission of such acts.”43 The 1994 Declaration was 
followed two years later by a second Declaration along the same lines, 
suggesting the general willingness of the international community to 
address the problem of terrorism and terrorist havens.44
The attacks of September 11th, like the tragic wars in the Former 
Yugoslavia, the Rwandan genocide, and the horrific bombing of Pan Am 
103, presented the world with yet another opportunity to further strengthen 
the enforcement of international criminal law norms, and fill the gap in 
enforcement that has plagued efforts to control international terrorists. 
Indeed, if we leave aside the question whether the acts of September 11th 
 
 
Resolution 955, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 
(1994). 
 41. See generally LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002); Sadat & 
Carden, supra note 17. 
 42. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR 
6th Comm., 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/60 (1994). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. 
GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. Res/51/210 (1996). 
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were armed attacks or war crimes, they could clearly be characterized as 
acts of international terrorism45 and crimes against humanity.46 They 
involved the intentional killing (murder) of several thousand civilians and 
appear to have been carried out pursuant to a widespread and arguably 
systematic attack against a civilian population pursuant to the policy of the 
al Qaeda criminal organization, thus fulfilling the definition of crimes 
against humanity in the Rome statute for the International Criminal 
Court.47 Moreover, there is no doubt that the attacks violated several of the 
international terrorism conventions referred to earlier,48 and that the 
perpetrators could be prosecuted in U.S. courts under several different 
federal statutes.49
 
 
 45. This Essay, admittedly, does not address the often difficult question of terrorism’s definition. 
For a discussion of this question, see generally James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New World of 
Terrorism: A Lawyer’s View, 31 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 101 (2003). 
 46. To the extent that the al Qaeda movement indiscriminately targets persons of particular 
nationalities for extermination, its actions could even be considered genocidal in character. See also id. 
at 108. 
 47. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 7(1)(a). 
 48. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 49. Obviously, the death of the Sept. 11 hijackers precludes their prosecution. However, the 
indictments of other notable terror suspects are instructive regarding possible criminal charges brought 
against their accomplices. For example, the indictment of John Phillip Walker Lindh included the 
following charges: conspiracy to murder nationals of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332(b)(2) (2002); conspiracy to provide material support and resources to foreign terrorist 
organizations (Harakat ul-Muhahideen and al Qaeda), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339(b) (2002); 
conspiracy to contribute services to al Qaeda, in violation of 31 C.F.R. §§ 595.205 and 595.204 and 50 
U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2002). Lindh pled guilty to a charge of supplying services to the Taliban, in 
violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2002), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2002). United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp.2d 
565 (E.D. Va. 2002). Richard Reid was indicted for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(1) (2002); attempted homicide, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332 
(2002); placing explosive devices on an aircraft, in violation of 49 U.S.C. §§ 46505(b)(3) and (c) 
(2002); attempted murder, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46506(1) (2002) and 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2002); 
interference with flight crew members and attendants, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2002); 
attempted destruction of aircraft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(1) and (7) (2002); using 
destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
(2002); and attempted wrecking of mass transportation vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1993(a)(1) 
and (8) (2002). Note that Reid’s motion to dismiss the final charge has been granted. United States v. 
Reid, 206 F. Supp.2d 132 (Mass. 2002). Finally, Zakarias Moussaoui was indicted for the following: 
conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2332b(a)(2) and (c) (2002); conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, in violation of 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 46502(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(B) (2002); conspiracy to destroy aircraft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 32(a)(7) and (34) (2002); conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332(a)(a) (2002); conspiracy to murder United States employees, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 
and 1117 (2002); and conspiracy to destroy property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f), (i), (n) 
(2002). United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 509 (E.D. Va. 2003). The prosecution in the case 
was recently barred from seeking the death penalty and from bringing forth testimony that Moussaoui 
“had any involvement in, or knowledge of, the September 11 attacks” as a sanction for the United 
States’ refusal to allow enemy combatant detainees to testify on Moussaoui’s defense. United States v. 
Moussaoui, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17253 at 16 (U.S. Dist., 2003). 
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The U.S. government and the international community generally 
characterized the attacks of September 11th as criminal acts, as evidenced 
by the Security Council Resolutions adopted after the fact. Security 
Council Resolution 1373 is extraordinary in this regard. First, building 
upon the experience of the past decade, the Council assumed that the 
offenses were crimes of universal international jurisdiction that could be 
defined by the international community (and presumably could be the 
subject of adjudication by an international tribunal) and followed by 
international enforcement action. That is, the Security Council, invoking 
its Chapter VII authority, has suggested, through its pronouncements after 
the fact, that the acts of September 11th amounted to international crimes 
over which the international community (and presumably states, a subject 
beyond the scope of the present Essay) may assert universal international 
jurisdiction.50 Although this is consistent with the position the Council has 
taken in asserting jurisdiction over the crimes committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it is a dramatic extension of those precedents 
because it suggests that they now apply to acts of international terrorism. 
Moreover, as alluded to above, there was substantial debate prior to 
September 11th, 2001, whether terrorism was a universal jurisdiction 
crime at all. Many national tribunals had opined that it was not, and the 
Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction, adopted in January 2001, 
nine months prior to the attack, omitted terrorism from the list of crimes 
over which States could presumptively exercise universal jurisdiction.51 
Whether Resolution 1373 is the codification of custom, instant custom, or 
a new form of Security Council “legislation,”52 its adoption suggests a sea 
change in opinio juris on the issue of terrorism as a universal jurisdiction 
crime, enacted against the backdrop of a custom that had already been 
evolving in that direction. 
In addition, Resolution 1373 appears to suggest that the principle aut 
dedere, aut judicare is also a matter of customary international law. That 
is, to the extent a crime is a universal jurisdiction crime, this principle 
appears to apply as a matter of customary international law. This would 
 
 
 50. SADAT, supra note 41, at ch. 5. 
 51. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Principle 2(1) (Princeton 
Program in Law and Public Affairs, 2001). The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third) 
suggests that certain acts of terrorism are increasingly accepted as universal jurisdiction crimes, such 
as “assaults on the life or physical integrity of diplomatic personnel, kidnapping, and indiscriminate 
violent assaults on people at large.” RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 404 cmt. (a) (1986). 
 52. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 
(2002). 
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represent a tremendous advance in the enforcement of international 
criminal law norms by national legal systems. Resolution 1373 also 
provides that states must “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, 
support, or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens,” suggesting, like 
General Assembly Resolutions 49/60 and 51/210,53 that states may not 
serve as safe havens for terrorists without running afoul of international 
law. The question that remains is, of course, what consequences flow from 
a state’s breach of this obligation.  
Given the general prohibition in the U.N. Charter against the unilateral 
use of force by states in resolving international disputes, the course of 
action that appears most consistent with the existing framework of 
international law is to request the Security Council to intervene in cases 
involving terrorist attacks launched from one state against the territory of 
another. Although some have made the case for the legality of the October 
7th military response of the United States despite the absence of any 
explicit authorization of the Security Council, it should be noted that the 
facts of that case are quite unique. The Afghanistan situation involved 
attacks significant both in scale and symbolism, prior demands from the 
Security Council to the Taliban to turn over the individuals suspected of 
their organization, at least some evidence of complicity between the 
terrorist organization and the de facto government of Afghanistan, 
virtually universal and worldwide condemnation of the attacks themselves, 
and few questions as to their source. In other cases, the responsibility of a 
state may be much less evident, and the unanimity of the international 
community much less sure. In the case of September 11th, the United 
States could have obtained a third Security Council Resolution to enforce 
Resolution 1373. This final Resolution, like the famous Resolution 678 
that authorized operation Desert Storm, would have required the Taliban 
regime of Afghanistan to turn over Osama bin Laden and his accomplices, 
based upon evidence establishing the equivalent of “probable cause”54 that 
he and the al Qaeda network were responsible for the attacks of September 
11th. The resolution could have set a deadline for doing so, and authorized 
states to use “all necessary means” to effectuate his capture if the Taliban 
refused to surrender him, just as Resolution 678 did in 1990 with regard to 
 
 
 53. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
 54. For the argument that “clear and convincing evidence” of a State’s complicity should be the 
standard for a unilateral action based on self-defense in response to a terrorist attack launched from the 
territory of that State, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 
19, 21-28 (2002). This is not quite the same issue as what evidence should be required in order for the 
Security Council to issue the equivalent of an “arrest warrant” for the capture of a suspect in a case of 
international terrorism. 
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the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.55 There is no doubt that this hypothetical 
international “arrest warrant” would have been issued by the Security 
Council at the United States’ urging—the world expressed both its sorrow 
and solidarity with the United States in the wake of the September 11th 
attacks, and at the time Resolutions 1368 and 1373 were adopted, bin 
Laden was threatening the United Nations as a future target of his terrorist 
network. In this way, the U.S.-led military action and response to 
international terrorism would have set an important precedent and would 
have reinforced the normative content and institutional framework of 
international law.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The temptation to jettison legal constraints is understandable when 
faced with a hostile enemy that does not itself obey the law. Perhaps there 
are times when law fails, or when civil disobedience is appropriate if law 
itself becomes illegal or immoral. But the attacks of September 11th did 
not present such a case. Indeed, the hideousness of the acts themselves so 
shocked the international community that they provided a unique 
opportunity to strengthen a growing international consensus condemning 
attacks on civilians whatever the motivation.56 This is not to suggest that a 
military response was necessarily illegal under the circumstances, only 
that any military actions taken must, to be effective in the long term, 
employ force in service of the rule of law. The ultimate test of America’s 
strength will not be its ability to respond militarily to threats all over the 
world, threats that are by definition, random, designed to inflict terror, and 
carried out by very small numbers of individuals willing to die in the 
process of carrying out their criminal design. Instead, America’s strength 
will lie in its ability to persuade others to join its cause against 
international terrorism and to establish international institutions and 
international norms to do so, norms which states are willing to enforce 
domestically.57  
The attacks of September 11th presented the United States with an 
extraordinary opportunity to reshape the norms of international law to 
 
 
 55. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (1990). For an excellent 
treatment of recent Security Council practice involving Chapter VII see Mary Ellen O’Connell, The 
U.N., NATO, and International Law after Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 67-70 (2000). 
 56. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Future of International Law: Ending the U.S.-Europe Divide, in 
A DEFINING MOMENT—INTERNATIONAL LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, Crimes of War Project, 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/sept-contrib.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2003). 
 57. Cf. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER (2002). 
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promote their effective enforcement. International conventions against 
terrorism that proved ineffective to the extent terrorists could take refuge 
in states that had either unwillingly or willingly become accomplices to 
their action were to be enforced by Security Council action in the event 
that other means proved ineffective, and the terrorists’ activities threatened 
the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, 
international military action, guided by law and explicitly authorized by a 
Resolution of the Security Council, would seemingly have proven no less 
effective than a military campaign launched on more ambiguous terms. 
Viewing the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan as an international 
criminal law enforcement operation, rather than an act of retribution would 
also have created a positive precedent for future cases. The present 
unilateralist approach provides states wishing to do so with the 
opportunity to eliminate dissidents and those otherwise opposed to their 
rule, including governments or rebels in neighboring states, by labeling 
them “terrorists,” and therefore not subject to the normal legal constraints 
that govern the use of force.58 This erosion of the rule of law is in the 
interest of no state in the world, not even the world’s only superpower. 
While the terrorists of September 11th may have been self-styled warriors, 
they and their ilk are not combatants engaged in international armed 
conflict, but pathological criminals that require arrest and deterrence.59 
Although it is now fashionable to suggest that we must abandon liberal 
regimes in favor of a new Hobbesian reality when faced with the menace 
of ruthless international criminals, Hobbes himself did not suggest that 
“going it alone” was the solution to survival in the state of nature. Instead, 
because even the strongest man can be felled by the weakest, with a knife 
in the back as he sleeps, cooperation and trust are prerequisites for survival 
in a world where life is, otherwise, nasty, brutish and short.60  
One can only hope that, with time, the United States government will 
return to the measured process of building effective multilateral regimes, 
and abandon the unilateralist path it now appears to tread. There may be a 
place or even a need for the use of force in response to the deadly acts of 
 
 
 58. This has occurred in Russia, in China, in Israel, and in Uzbekistan, for example. 
 59. See also Reisman, supra note 23, at 3. 
 60. Of course, under Hobbes’ scheme, for cooperation to work there must be some power of 
enforcement, which is why he has often been cited for the proposition that the state of nature is 
preferable to cooperation in international affairs, unless it can be argued that the current collective 
security mechanism of the U.N. or the new International Criminal Court can provide such an 
enforcement mechanism. Thanks to Professor Larry May for bringing his wonderful analysis of 
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming). 
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international terrorists, but military power must be employed judiciously 
and subject to the constraints of international law. Bombing bin Laden 
may salve the pain of those victimized by his crimes, but it is unlikely 
either to bring him to bay or prevent the commission of future atrocities.61 
This is particularly true if the military action and subsequent policies of 
the U.S. government further erode respect for the rule of law, and lessen 
the moral leadership that the United States could otherwise provide. 
 
 
 61. Cf. Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 26 FLETCHER FOR. WORLD AFF. 17 (2002). 
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